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Abstract. The sum of a supermodular function, assumed nondecreas-
ing in the choice variable, and of a concavely supermodularizable func-
tion, assumed nonincreasing in the parameter variable, satises the Milgrom-
Shannon (1994, Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62, 157-180)
single crossing condition. As an application, I prove existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in a Cournot duopoly with logconcave demand,
a¢ liated types, and nondecreasing costs.
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1. Introduction
Monotone comparative statics has proven to be a useful tool in numerous eco-
nomic applications (Topkis, 1978; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Over time,
cardinal notions of supermodularity have been rened into more general, or-
dinal variants (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). However, ordinal techniques
are less straightforward to apply when the problem is characterized by a sep-
arable objective function. For instance, while the sum of two supermodular
functions is again supermodular, the sum of two logsupermodular functions
need not be logsupermodular.1
In this paper, I show that the sum of a supermodular function, assumed
to be monotone increasing in the choice variable, and a concavely supermod-
ularizable function, assumed to be monotone decreasing in the parameter
variable, satises the Milgrom-Shannon single crossing condition. As an ap-
plication, I prove existence of an isotone equilibrium in a Cournot duopoly
with logconcave demand, a¢ liated types, and nondecreasing costs. This is
the rst result of this sort that both makes assumptions solely on primitives
of the model and works without negative prices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 denes and
characterizes the notion of concavely increasing di¤erences. The key result of
the paper is stated and proved in Section 3. Section 4 contains the application
to the Cournot model.
2. Concavely increasing di¤erences
This section introduces the notion of concavely increasing di¤erences and
1Cf. Athey (2002).
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o¤ers a characterization that will be useful to prove the key result of this
paper. I will make use of the standard terminology and notation introduced
in Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Denitions and clarications of the basic
concepts should be sought there.
Denition 1. Let X be a lattice, and T be a partially ordered set. A
function g : X  T ! R has [strict] concavely increasing di¤erences
in (x; t) if for any x0 > x00 and t0 > t00,
(g(x0; t0))  (g(x00; t0)) 
[>]
(g(x0; t00))  (g(x00; t00)) (1)
for some strictly increasing, concave transformation .2
Obviously, any function with increasing di¤erences has concavely increasing
di¤erences. Moreover, any function that is logsupermodular on the product
space XT has concavely increasing di¤erences.3 Note, however, that there
are functions that fulll neither property and still satisfy Denition 1. In- Example
1 here
deed, in Example 1, the inequality (19)   (29)  (18)   (27) fails for
transformations (y) = y and (y) = ln y, yet holds for (y) =  1=y.
Denition 1 allows formulating su¢ cient conditions on a separable ob-
jective function to satisfy the Milgrom-Shannon single crossing property. To
prepare the key result, I state the following characterization of concavely
increasing di¤erences.
Lemma 1. A function g has [strict] concavely increasing di¤erences in (x; t)
if and only if for any x0 > x00 and t0 > t00 such that minfg(x00; t0); g(x0; t00)g 
2The transformation may, but need not depend on the vector (x0; x00; t0; t00). Moreover,
the domain of the transformation must be some interval.
3Another example are rootsupermodular functions, as dened by Eeckhout and Kircher
(forthcoming).
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minfg(x00; t00); g(x0; t0)g, the inequality
g(x0; t0)  g(x00; t0) 
[>]
g(x0; t00)  g(x00; t00) (2)
holds.
Proof. The proof is given for the case of nonstrict di¤erences only. The other
case is completely analogous. Only if. Assume g has concavely increasing
di¤erences in (x; t), and x x0 > x00 and t0 > t00. Write a = g(x00; t00), b =
g(x00; t0), c = g(x0; t00), and d = g(x0; t0). Then there is a strictly increasing,
concave transformation  such that (d)   (b)  (c)   (a). Consider
minfb; cg  minfa; dg, say a  b  c. Then necessarily c  d, because  is
strictly increasing and (a) + (d)  (b) + (c). To prove (2), assume to
the contrary that d b < c a, so that with a concave and strictly increasing
, (d) (b) < (c) (a), a contradiction. If. Using the same notation,
assume g satises d  b  c  a provided that minfb; cg  minfa; dg. I need
to nd a strictly increasing, concave  such that (b) + (c)  (a) + (d).
Consider rst minfb; cg < minfa; dg. If b = c, the claim follows for any
strictly increasing . Therefore, without loss of generality, b < a; c; d. In
this case, dene (a) = a, (c) = c, (d) = d, and (b) su¢ ciently negative
so that (b) + (c)  (a) + (d). Clearly,  can be extended to a strictly
increasing, concave function on R. Consider now minfb; cg  minfa; dg.
Then, by assumption, b + c  a + d. Clearly, in this case,  can be chosen
linear. 
Thus, concavely increasing di¤erences requires increasing di¤erences only
when o¤-diagonal entries do not undercut the minimum diagonal entry.
For illustration, note that Lemma 1 implies that any monotone function,
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either increasing or decreasing, that exhibits concavely increasing di¤erences
must have increasing di¤erences.
3. Separable objective functions
The key result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1. Let X be a lattice, and T be a partially ordered set. Consider
functions g; h : X  T ! R. Assume that g has concavely increasing di¤er-
ences in (x; t) and is nondecreasing [nonincreasing] in t. Assume also that
h has increasing di¤erences in (x; t) and is nonincreasing [nondecreasing] in
x. Then g + h satises the single crossing condition in (x; t). If, in addi-
tion, g has strict concavely increasing di¤erences and is strictly increasing
[decreasing] in t, then g + h satises the strict single crossing property in
(x; t).
Proof. According to the denition, f = g + h satises the single crossing
property in (x; t) if for x0 > x00 and t0 > t00, f(x0; t00)  f(x00; t00) implies that
f(x0; t0)  f(x00; t0) and f(x0; t00) > f(x00; t00) implies that f(x0; t0) > f(x00; t0).
So take arbitrary x0 > x00 and t0 > t00. Impose
f(x0; t00)  f(x00; t00). (3)
Since h is nonincreasing in x, inequality (3) implies g(x0; t00)  g(x00; t00).
Moreover, g is nondecreasing in t, so g(x00; t0)  g(x00; t00). By assumption, g
has concavely increasing di¤erences. Thus, by Lemma 1,
g(x0; t0)  g(x00; t0)  g(x0; t00)  g(x00; t00). (4)
But h has increasing di¤erences in (x; t), so that
h(x0; t0)  h(x00; t0)  h(x0; t00)  h(x00; t00). (5)
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Adding (4) and (5) term by term yields
f(x0; t0)  f(x00; t0)  f(x0; t00)  f(x00; t00). (6)
Combining this with (3), one obtains
f(x0; t0)  f(x00; t0)  0. (7)
as desired. Moreover, if inequality (3) holds strictly, so does (7). This proves
the claim for nonstrict di¤erences. To prove the claim also for strict di¤er-
ences, note that inequality (4) is then strict, so that inequality (3) implies
the strict version of (7), as required by the strict single crossing property. 
For intuition, focus on T and X being two-element subsets of R, and 
being the logarithm. Clearly, the conclusion is obvious when g has actually
increasing di¤erences. So assume that the slope g(x
0;t) g(x00;t)
x0 x00 , regarded as a
function of t, strictly decreases, while the ratio g(x
0;t)
g(x00;t) weakly increases in t,
as illustrated in Figure 1. Since g is nondecreasing in t, a moments reection
shows that this is possible only when g is strictly downward-sloping at t00.4
But then, adding a function h that is nonincreasing in x implies the single
crossing condition for the sum. Figure
1 here
To extend Theorem 1, re-order T (or, equivalently, X). E.g., assume that
g has concavely decreasing di¤erences in (x; t), which is dened in analogy to
Denition 1, and that g is nonincreasing [nondecreasing] in t. Then, with h
having decreasing di¤erences in (x; t) and being nonincreasing [nondecreas-
ing] in x, it follows that g + h satises the dual single crossing condition in
(x; t).
4Indeed, if g were upwards sloping or at at t00, then the strictly lower slope at t0 would
make the ratio g(x0; t)=g(x00; t) decline strictly in t.
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Another extension assumes that g has convexly increasing or decreasing
di¤erences in (x; t), where again, the notions are dened in analogy to De-
nition 1. For instance, when g has convexly increasing di¤erences in (x; t)
and is nondecreasing [nonincreasing] in t, and h has increasing di¤erences in
(x; t) and is nondecreasing [nonincreasing] in x, then g+h satises the single
crossing property.5
Theorem 1 is readily applied to the comparative statics of optimization
problems and noncooperative games using the results in Milgrom and Shan-
non (1994).6 For instance, Amirs (1996) main result follows directly from
Theorem 1. But Theorem 1 can also be fruitfully applied to Bayesian games,
as illustrated in the next section.
4. Application
This section deals with equilibrium existence in the Cournot duopoly with
a¢ liated types. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is known to exist re-
gardless of distributional assumptions provided certainty payo¤s are sub-
modular in rms actions (Vives, 1990). Under additional complementarities
between actions and types, even an isotone equilibrium exists for a¢ liated
types (Athey, 2001, McAdams, 2003, Van Zandt and Vives, 2007). However,
cardinal submodularity in actions is not a completely innocuous assumption
in the Bayesian Cournot model because uncertainty then tends to generate
negative prices (Einy et al., 2010).7
5Indeed, it is not di¢ cult to check that g has convexly increasing di¤erences in (x; t)
if and only if  g has concavely decreasing di¤erences in (x; t), so that the claim follows
from the rst extension.
6Only when the choice set is not a chain, each term needs to be supermodular in the
choice variable to ensure the sum is quasisupermodular in x.
7Indeed, Cournot prots that are submodular in actions imply Novsheks (1985) mar-
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Addressing this issue, I will show now that a logconcave inverse demand
and nondecreasing costs are su¢ cient for the existence of an isotone equilib-
rium in a duopoly with a¢ liated costs. In contrast to prior results, negative
prices do not obtain even though all assumptions are on the primitives of the
model.
Inverse demand is given by a nonincreasing function p, assumed to be
nonnegative and logconcave. There are two rms i = 1; 2, each receiving a
private signal ti, referred to as the rms type, and drawn from a compact
interval Ti  R. Types are inversely a¢ liated, i.e., jointly distributed ac-
cording to some a.e. logsubmodular density.8 Each rm i produces output
xi  0 at costs Ci(xi; t), where t = (ti; t i). Costs are assumed nondecreas-
ing and continuous in output. Moreover, marginal costs are nonincreasing
in own type, while (potentially) nondecreasing in the other rms type. It is
assumed that there is an output level x above which no rm has an incentive
to operate.9 Denote rm is strategy by i = i(ti). Expected prots of a
rm i of type ti producing output xi read
fi(xi; ti) =
Z
xip(xi +  i(t i))  Ci(xi; t)di(t ijti), (8)
where i denotes the conditional distribution function of t i given ti. It is
claimed that fi has the single crossing property in (xi; ti) provided  i is
ginal revenue condition on inverse demand. The marginal revenue condition, in turn, can
be seen to be equivalent to inverse demand being a concave function of log-output. Hence,
if inverse demand is declining somewhere, it must eventually cause negative prices.
8The density is assumed bounded and atomless, to ensure that expected revenues and
costs exist and are nite for all type subintervals and for all nondecreasing strategies of
the rival.
9For instance, assume that xip(xi)  Ci(xi; t) <  Ci(0; t) for all i = 1; 2, t 2 Ti  T i,
and xi > x.
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monotone increasing. For this, write fi = gi + hi, where
gi(xi; ti) =
Z
xip(xi +  i(t i))di(t ijti) and (9)
hi(xi; ti) =  
Z
Ci(xi; t)di(t ijti), (10)
respectively, denote expected revenues and (negatively signed) expected costs.
To apply Theorem 1, note that ex post revenues xip(xi+x i) are logsubmodu-
lar in (xi; x i). Hence, because  i is monotone increasing, xip(xi+ i(t i)) is
logsubmodular in (xi; t i). Therefore, with inversely a¢ liated types, gi is log-
supermodular in (xi; ti).10 Moreover, as p is nonincreasing,  i is monotone
increasing, and types are inversely a¢ liated, it follows that gi is nondecreas-
ing in ti. Consider now the cost term. By assumption, Ci(xi; t) is submodular
in (xi; ti) and supermodular in (xi; t i). As types are inversely a¢ liated, it
follows that hi is supermodular in (xi; ti).11 Furthermore, since costs are non-
decreasing in output, hi is nonincreasing in xi. Thus, fi satises the single
crossing condition in (xi; ti) for any nondecreasing  i. It follows now from
Corollary 2.1 in Athey (2001) that an isotone pure strategy Nash equilibrium
exists.
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Example 1 − The tabulated function g fails to satisfy increasing 
diff i ( t) d l d l it b t h lerences n x; an  ogsupermo u ar y, u  as concave y 
increasing differences in (x;t).
g(x‘‘,t‘)
t‘
g(x‘‘ t‘‘) t‘‘
g(x‘,t‘‘)
g(x‘,t‘)
,
x‘‘ x‘
Figure 1 − If the slope of g with respect to x strictly decreases in t, 
th ti ( ‘ t)/ ( ‘‘ t) kl i i t d i te ra o g x , g x ,  wea y ncreases n , an  g s mono one 
increasing in t, then g must be downwards sloping at t‘‘.
